On Empathy

During the 18th century, a new moral perspective called moral sentiment theory emerged, primarily in Scotland and later spreading more widely. The controversial 18th-century Scottish philosopher, David Hume, argued that moral judgments and a sense of moral duty are not based on reason but are grounded in emotions. Hume proposed that our imaginative and empathetic capacities give rise to moral sentiments; emotional responses such as compassion, sympathy, or pity towards those who suffer or are mistreated by others. According to Hume, these feelings are the foundation of all moral judgments and actions. Thus, morality is based on affective responses, with reason serving primarily to rationalise and justify the directions indicated by our emotional reactions. However, critics argue that Hume's theory of moral sentiment is unreliable, unrealistic, and not an adequate basis for moral duty. In this essay, I will examine Hume's theory, explore some of the criticism it has faced and explain why I believe that while moral sentiments may indeed influence our moral judgements and behaviours, they may not provide an adequate basis for moral duty.

How do we know what is right or wrong in a world of countless opinions, views, and beliefs? Hume would suggest that when faced with a moral dilemma, we ask ourselves how it makes us feel; the answer will reveal our morality. According to Hume, morality should be felt rather than judged.[1] Hume's idea of a moral sentiment could be summarised as a natural emotional response; when we witness or imagine the suffering of others, we naturally experience empathy which leads us to approve or disapprove of specific actions and forms the basis of our moral determinations.[2] Hume's theory of moral sentiments posits that humans are not inherently selfish beings. Instead, Hume considers humans to have an innate capacity for empathy and benevolence. According to Hume, this capacity arises from our ability to feel another’s emotions and imagine ourselves in another’s situation. Hume argued that our inherent ability to feel allows us to understand and empathise with another person's suffering. When we see someone in pain, we naturally sympathise with them. When we witness an act of malevolence, we naturally recoil in disapproval. Similarly, we feel a sense of approval when we witness acts of benevolence. Thus, Hume argues, humans act morally due to natural and intuitive emotional responses rather than out of a sense of duty or reason.[3]

In response to Hume, alternative theories of morality emerged. One such theory is deontological ethics, which is based on the idea that specific actions are inherently right or wrong regardless of their consequences. One of the most prominent advocates of deontological ethics is Kant. According to Kant, morality relies on principles or rules that prescribe specific actions and behaviours. Kant argued that we should act only in ways we would like to become universal laws.[4] In other words, we should act as we would want everyone else to act in similar situations. One of the strengths of Kant's argument is its emphasis on principles and boundaries. Deontological ethics provides a clear and objective basis for moral duty by focusing on the universal principles of right and wrong – which can prevent emotions or personal biases from clouding our judgment. However, deontological ethics are inflexible and rigid. By relying on fixed rules or principles, one may fail to account for the complexities and nuances of real-life situations. Also, the emphasis on duty and obligation may not resonate with those who believe true morality should include empathy and compassion.

In contrast to Kant, Hume's theory could explain the almost universal and intuitive understanding of certain moral judgements (lying is wrong) and their nuances (lying to save a life is justified). After all, a significant portion of our mental life is believed to be unconscious and beyond our rational conscious control. However, we may question whether we should establish morality on the shaky foundation of our unconscious emotions, given that many of them are self-centred and fickle. Furthermore, empathy may be an inadequate basis for morality, considering it also contains several opposing aspects (which I will cover shortly). Moreover, our imaginative and empathetic responses to others may not fully explain how and why we treat them the way we do.

To explore these ideas further, we must look to another critic of Hume's theory – contemporary philosopher Jessie Prinz. While both Prinz and Hume acknowledge the significance of empathy, their theories differ regarding their underlying mechanisms. Prinz focuses on the embodied nature of empathy, highlighting the role of emotional contagion and the mirroring of emotions.[5] Prinz's approach aligns with contemporary scientific research and the neural and psychological processes underlying empathy, and his work is informed by contemporary research and scientific findings. Thus, Prinz's approach incorporates more recent and objective scientific insights into empathy. In contrast, Hume's theory was formed before the advent of modern neuroscience.

Essentially, Prinz argues that empathy is bad for morality, not necessary for morality, not enough for morality and may even prevent morality.[6] Additionally, he asserts that relying solely on emotions, including empathy, as a basis for moral judgment is unreliable. Similarly, Prinz argues that empathy has a dark side that must be acknowledged; empathy can be manipulated and exploited, becoming a tool used in rhetoric to influence people into making poor decisions.[7] Moreover, empathy has its limitations. In times of personal desperation and despair, our capacity to help others may be diminished by the overwhelming emotions we experience.[8] Prinz also notes that while empathy is often considered a crucial element in moral judgment, there are instances where individuals clinically lacking in empathy (such as psychopaths or people with autism) can still exhibit moral behaviour via conditioning through external rewards and punishments.[9]

This raises the question of whether a moral person can actually exist without empathy. Prinz argues that they can; one can choose to or be conditioned to act morally and "do the right thing" without necessarily empathising with the person involved.[10] Furthermore, he points out that psychological evidence suggests that guilt and reward may be more effective in shaping moral behaviour than empathy. [11]Additionally, Prinz posits that anger and moral outrage can serve as powerful motivators, often surpassing the impact of empathy; contrary to popular belief, moral outrage can exist independently of empathy.[12] For example, anger directed towards distant injustices may be action-oriented rather than person-focused, indicating that moral outrage can arise without genuine empathy for the victims.

Our tendency to empathise more readily with individuals perceived as similar to us reveals what Hoffman called the ‘similarity bias’.[13] Paradoxically, empathy can hinder us from empathising with 'outsiders', inhibiting our ability to promote justice and fairness and challenging the notion that empathy is an essential component of justice. Prinz notes that ‘We are grotesquely partial to the near and dear’ and how empathy could lead us to condemn the actions of a close friend's controlling spouse more readily than the violent and oppressive leader situated far away, demonstrating how empathy can distort our moral judgments.[14] Empathy alone does not guarantee just, fair, and equitable outcomes, as it can be influenced by factors such as race, sex, time, and place. Hence, reason should be employed to temper and guide our empathic responses, allowing for a more reliable and objective moral judgment.

Critics of Hume's theory have raised several objections, the most compelling being that it is unreliable and unrealistic. Hume's emphasis on emotions as the basis for morality is unreliable because emotions are influenced by confounding factors, such as individual experiences, cultural differences, and personal biases. Furthermore, psychological evidence suggests that reward and punishment, or moral outrage, may be more influential in shaping moral behaviour. The inherent subjectivity of a morality based on emotions raises valid questions about its objectivity and universality. Despite the appeal of a moral sentiment, human beings are frequently selfish, and altruistic behaviour is rare. Hume's view suggests that we possess an innate altruistic desire to assist others, even at some cost or inconvenience to ourselves. However, critics are quick to point out that people primarily act out of self-interest rather than a desire to promote the well-being of others.

In conclusion, empathy, although necessary, has its limitations. Accordingly, reason should be employed alongside it to promote just and equitable moral decision-making. Hume's theory is incomplete because it does not account for the role of reason in moral decision-making. Moral duty must be grounded in something more solid than emotional responses and morality should be based on rational considerations as well as empathy. Emotions can be erratic and inconsistent, making them an unreliable foundation for moral obligations. Relying solely on emotions may not provide clear enough guidelines for resolving moral dilemmas. Moral judgments must involve both reason and empathy working together, and Hume's interpretation fails to capture this delicate interplay. While sympathy and compassion may encourage us to act in ways that benefit others, they do not necessarily provide enough of a reason for many of us to do so. While emotions may influence our moral behaviour, they may not always be the most reliable guides. Our emotional responses may lead us awry.

Perhaps, enforceable morality, based on reason, is necessary until humans evolve into naturally benevolent and compassionate beings – at all times, to all sentient beings, in all places – I am doubtful but remain hopeful. Ultimately, human morality is a matter of ongoing philosophical debate.

References

Arrington, R. (1997). "Hume" in Western Ethics: An Historical Introduction.

Hoffmann, M. L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.

Prinz, J. (2011). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.

Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy. The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 49, Spindel Supplement

[1] Arrington, R. (1997). "Hume" in Western Ethics: An Historical Introduction.

[2] Arrington, R. (1997). Western Ethics: An Historical Introduction.

[3] Arrington, R. (1997). Western Ethics: An Historical Introduction.

[4] Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.

[5] Prinz, J. (2011). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.

[6] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy. The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 49, Spindel Supplement

[7] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy.

[8] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy.

[9] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy.

[10] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy.

[11] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy.

[12] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy.

[13] Hoffmann, M. L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. Cambridge University Press.

[14] Prinz, J. (2011). Against Empathy. P. 224